July 1996 revised, January 1997 Abstract This paper develops an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications. In this model, vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would, as an independent firm, provide a generalized input. The changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails; vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm's costs at the downstream level. The choice of a specialized input by the integrated firm serves as a natural commitment mechanism not to supply the rival downstream firms, and thus enables us to dispense with the controversial price commitment assumption in the literature. We derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences.
L Introduction
Mti-competitive effects of vertical mergers continue to be a source of disagreement among economists and antitrust practitioners. This lack of consensus, reflected by large pendulous swings over time in the antitrust enforcement activities regarding vertical mergers, is mainly due to the fact that the intellectual foundation of the classical foreclosure theory was laid on shaky ground. Legal commentators, in particular, from the Chicago school revealed the logical flaws and ill-conceivedness of the theory and subsequently ugued that vertical integration was tnost likely to be pro-competitive or competitively neutral (Bork, 1978) . Their criticisms had a major influence on antitrust activities and was largely responsible in the 1970's and 1980's for the dormancy of antitrust enforcement with vertical elements (Riordan, 1995) .T he Chicago school criticism, however, has also spawned a new research program that attempts to place vertical foreclosure theory on a órmer theoretical ground with game-theoretic foundations (see Ordover, Salop, and Saloner [ 1990] ; Hart and Tirole [1990] ; Bolton and Whinston [1993] ; and Salinger [I988] ). Ordover, Salop, and Saloner (henceforth, O-S-S), for instance, construct an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure that purportedly answers all the major elements of the Chicago school criticism, such as the possibility of a counter-merger by the foreclosed firm and the hold-out irtcentives that the target upstream fum may have in the acquisition process. As pointed out by Reiffen (1992) and many others, however, O-S-S's model is deficient in making the assumption that the vertically integrated firm is able to make a price commitmen~to the nonintegrated downstream firm.2 This assumption essentially transforms the vertically integrated firm into a Stackelberg leader and changes the nature of the input pricing game (see Reiffen's ' The paa of government enforcement activitia, howevu, pidced up raently espocially in telccommunications industry (Klass aod Salinger, 1995) j Reiffen and Vita (1995) state Ihat "the Ordovu U al. analysis lava wiaruwered the question that dogged earlier e0'ons to provide an oconomic rationale for a rslationship betwxn intcgration and foreclosure...Ordover ot al.'s atNlity to obtain a post-merger prico increases is an artifact a~f an inconsistency in their nadcl."
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[1992] cortvnent and Ordover, Salop, and Saloner's [1992] reply for details).
In this paper, we develop a model of vertical foreclosure which dispenses with the controversia) assumption of price commitment in the O-S-S model; the integrated firm is allowed to undercut the rival upstream firm whenever it is profitable. In other aspects, we closely follows O-S-S in that the model fully accounts for the availability of a conterstrategy by the foreclosed fum and the possibility of a hold-out problem by the target firm in the vertical merger process.3
Consider a situation in which downstream firms produce differentiated products.
As a result of producing differentiated output, it is assumed that they demand differentiated inputs from upstream firms. This may be due to the fact that they employ different manufacturing processes or that differentiated outputs simply require a different speci5cation of inputs. C~ur formulation departs from O-S-S and the existing literature in that the upstream firrns make decisions with respect to the specification of the input demanded by the downstream firms. In particular, we assume that the upstream firms can choose (only) one of the following with respect to input specifications: a generalized input that can be used by both downstream firms or a specialized input that is dedicated to one of the two downstream firms. We further assume that the input specialized for one of the downstream órms is less useful to the other downstream firtn. Therefore, an upstream firm's decision to supply one of the specialized inputs can serve as a commitment mechanism to foreclose (downstream) firms other than the one the input is specifically designed for. By introducing differentiated inputs, our formulation thus provides a natural setting where the issue of vertical Foreclosure can be addressed.
With this framework, we demonstrate that under the non-integrated vertical ' The rcason for considering these possibilities is to mcet the objections of the "Chicago School" who argue that vertical foroclosurc is implausible as an equilibrium phenomenon when these possibiliUes are explicitly talceo into aooount. See the discussion in PS-S (1990) for more deuils. Aghioo aod Bollon (198~, Ratmuaeo, Ramseyer. and Wiley (1991) , aad McAfee and Schwartz (1994) also emphasiu the neod to consider a fully spxified cquilibriwn model for a meaningfiil analysis of the rauonality and the welfare implications of exclusionary stralegies. structure, both upstream órms tend to choose the generalized input and compete for the businesses of both downstream firms. However, (partial) vertical integration changes the integrated upstream firm's incentives concerning input specification; the integrated upstream firm switches its input specification from the generalized input to the specialized input for the downstream firm that belongs to the same integrated structure. The main intuition for this result can be explained by considering the external effects associated with the choice of a speciSc input. When one upstream firm, say Ul, chooses a specialized input for one of the downstream 6rms, D 1, U 1 raises the cost of the other downstream firm D2 because of its withdrawal as D2's potential supplier. As a result, D 1 benefits from UI's decision to tailor its input supply for Dl. This beneficial effect is not accounted for when U 1 makes its input specification decision as an independent firtn. Since the choice of a specialized input entails giving up the chance to supply the rest of the market, no upstream firm is willing to supply specialized inputs when they operate as an independent firm. After integration, however, if the beneficial effect of raising the rival firm's costs is sufficiently Iarge, then the integrated firm may decide to supply the specialized input even if it must forego the chance to profitably supply the other downstream firm.
Why then will the nonintegrated downstream firm whose costs have been raised, not react with a counter-merger of its own to mitigate the adverse effect of its rival's initial merger? The crucial link in our model is provided by the stochastic nature of cost realizations. We assume that ïnput costs are more positively correlated when the same type of input is produced. For a variety of oligopoly models, competition is more intense when 5rms are more symmetrically positioned in terms of costs. Therefore, firms are collectively better off when their cost structure is asymmetric across firms (see Tirole, 1988, p. 223) . This implies that the reduction of cost correlation via the choice of a specialized input is similar to the provision of a public good; the cost of choosing a specialized input is the foregone chance to serve the other half of the market, and it is 3 borne out by the individual firm while the benefit of reduced cost correlation accrues to both upstresm firms. Thus, from the collective viewpoint of the upstream firms, their costs tend to be too correlated in the market outcome due to the undersupply of the public good, that is, they choose the same specification of input (the generalized input) too often.~Partial vertical integration enhances the private benefit of providing the public good (i.e., choosing a specialized input) by internalizing the beneficial effect of raising the rival firm's costs at the downstream level. This effect induces the integrated firm to undertake the provision of the public good itself and to overcome the public good problem. It will, however, be shown that under wide circumstances, a counter-merger changes the incentive of the initially integrated firm to revert back to the choice of the generalized input. The reason is that the rival downstream firm will now be supplied at the marginal cost of input production with the merger of its own and the effect of raising the rival firm's costs, which was responsible for the choice of a specialízed input by the integrated fitm under partial integration, no longer exists. As a result, a counter-merger can strip the wtislly merged firm of the incentive to provide the pubhc good (reduced cost correlation) and can intensify competition. This threat prevents counter-mergers from being materialized. t~ur paper closely relates to McLaren (1996) who considers the incentive for vertical integration that arises from the possibility of posi-contractual opportunistic behavior with specialized assets (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978) . As in our paper, his model allows for the endogenous choice of the degree of asset specificity by input providers. Vertical integration in his model creates a negative externality for outsiders by "thinning" the market for inputs and, thus, worsening opportunism problems. As he concedes in his own paper, however, he is not concetned with the "foreclosure" motive of ' This result is reminisant of Dasgupla and Masltin (1987) who show that the maricU portfolio of R~D projeqs ia chancterizod by excessive oorre~ation duc to a similar reason. As a firm moves away from its rival in the s~x of research projects, it txstows a positive externality on the rival firm in that tht liitelihood thai the rival is stwx~sful when the firtn in queuion is not, increases. This externaliry is not talce into aocatnt in the private fim~s' RdtD pontolio decisions. s vertical integation, which is the main concern of our paper. Rather, his focus is on how international trade affects the vertical structure of an industry by "thickening" the market.
McLaren shows that geater international openness brings convergence in the degee of outsourcing across countries and promotes a less integated vertical structure. In addition, vertical integation in McLaren's model possesses the property of "strategic complementarity" which can lead to multiple equilibria in the integation decisions.
Therefore, the vertical integation of one pair of upstream and downstream firms sets off a chain reaction involving the other firms. In contrast, we are interested in the case where a counter-merger is unprofitable and the effects of a foreclosure persist.
Our model also relates to Church and Gandal (1995) , who consider the possibility of foreclosure in systems markets where a fina! good consists of a hardware good and complementary software. They consider two options for software firms in their format decisions: Software firms can elect to either to make the software available ortly in a fortnat compatible with one particular hardware system or in formats compatible with both systems. In their model, foreclosure takes place when the integated órm refuses to supply compatible software for a rival system because the value of a system depends on the availability of software compatible with the system. Thus, the two options for software firrns in Church and Gandal (1995) correspond to the choice of a specialized input and a generalized input in our model, respectively.s In this respect, the model of Church and Gandal can be considered as a special case of ours if the format decision in their model is assumed to be an irreversible decision 6[n Church and Gandal, however, there are rw ' Church and Gandal (1995) also follow tho lead of 0.S-S in thaz thry consider a fully specified multistage game whert the possibilities of a counter suategy and a hold-0ut problem are accounted for. 6 Churcó and Crandal (1995) assume a timing structure in which constuners purchase hardwue first, then software to avoid the possibility that software vendors affect the marka share of a hardwarc technology by their pricing decisions. As a resul~only the number of software variaies compatible with exh hardware system will daemune the marlca share. Tltey argue Wat their results are robust to changes in the timing of the oootpatibiGty decision in that the same results are derived if an integrated firm simultaneauly chose its hardwarc ptice and its soRware format. Howevcr, if the integrated firm is given a chance to introdua its software in a format compatibk with the rival firm's system aJler conswners purchase hardware, it will have an erpast incentivc to do so. Therefore, their model sulïers hom the same type of The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section II develops an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications. We derive conditions for vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences.
In section III, we analyze an example of a Hotelling-type spatial competition. The consideration of an explicit example allows us to completely characterize the region where welfare-reducing vertical foreclosure occurs. Concluding remarks follow.
The Modd

A. Set-vp
We consider two downstream firms, Dl and D2, which compete in the final goods market. Two upstream firms, U1 and U2, supply inputs to the two downstream firms. As it will be made clear below, it is never optimal for both upstream firms to choose the same type of specialized input. In conjunction with the symmetry assumption, this allows us to assume, without loss of generality, that U I chooses S, and U2 chooses S: if they decide to supply specialized inputs. There are four possible cases of input lapanese software houses are Icnown to fit the former category, developing proprietary rystems for puticular ctistomers ( Baba, Takai, and Mizuta, 1995) .
x specifications to consider (G, G), (S,, S,), (G, S2) and (S,,G), where the first and second components in parentheses denote the choices of input specifications by Ul and U2, respectively. If (G, G) is the choice made by U1 and U2, both upstream firms are capable of supplying both downstream firms. However, if (S,, S,) is chosen, the input market for the two downstream firms is effectively segmented since U1 can supply only to Dl and similarly for U2 and D2. As a result, both upstream firms are monopolists in their own segmented markets ( only constrained by the competitive Cringe as explained below). If (G, S2) is chosen, Dl can be served only by Ul (and the competitive fringe) becausé U2 has dedicated its production process to supply for D2 only. However, there is competition between U1 and U2 to supply to D2 because D2 can use inputs from either upstream firm, the generalized input from Ul or the specialiu~input from U2. It is worthwhile to note that one consequence of Ui's decision to supply input S, is to limit competition in Dj's input market and thus raise Dj's costs, where i-1, 2 and ixj.
After the choice of input specificity, the production costs of inputs are realized randomly. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the cost of production takes only two values, c and c, where c~c. The cost uncertainty implies that double marginalization can arise when the firms are not vertically integrated ( Spengler, 1950) , and thus allows us to assess the conditions under which the hannful effects from vertical mergers outweigh the beneficial ones (Klass and Salinger, 1995) . Let the unconditional probability of each cost realization be equal regardless of the choice of input specification, i.e., Pr(, -Pr( c)
We allow the possibility of cost correlation across firms. More specifically, we assume that the costs arepositively correlated if both firms choose the same input specification. Cost correlation, however, can be reduced if the two upstream firms produce inputs of different specifications. In other words, they are more likely to be 9 We can easily generaliu the distributional asswnptions without affecting the main qualitative results. 
In all other choices of input specifications, we have
where (A, B) -(G, S,), (S,, G), or (S,, S2).
One natural intetpretation of the model is that we take the event of a low cost real'ustion as an innovation. Upstream firms have discretion over what kind of innovations to pursue. Choosing a generalized input specification can be considered as devoting their irtnovation resources to an innovation that can be used by both downstream firms. Choosing a specialized input specification amounts to concentrating on the improvement of inputs that is more important to one of the two downstream firtns.12 For instance, software developers have discretion over which platform to support (Church and 'oThe rattdotnness of tht casY reali7alions can also be due to the uncertainty in innovation In this case, it is well knowv that similar scientific advanas are often made more than one research teams wortcing independeHy of one artother, that is, the prottabilitiy of discoveries are highly corrclateC across research teams wheo they are engaged in similar projacts. Merton (1961) calls this type of phettomenon "multiples." " Mote generally, we could asstune that production of inputs with dr8erent specifiptions entails less correlated ooct strucxure without qualitatively aH'ecting the main rautts. 12 Sec Baldwin (1983) and Choi and Yi (1996) for an explicit analysis of RBeD incentíves in the contexi of vettical toergu.
Gandal, 1995).13 They can spend resources to an area that can be portable to either platform or exclusively focus on one platform. in this regard, it is interesting to note that MicrosoR has been alleged to be neglectful of the development of application soRware for the Macintosh operating system (Gleick, 1995) .~W e further assume that there is a competitive fringe that supplies the generalized input at the cost of c. As it will be clear later, this assumption is not crucial for our analysis and is made for expository convenience. The existence of fiinge firtns can serve as a lid on the price of inputs regardless of the upstream firms' input specificity choices and cost realizations. If we interpret the low cost real'vation as an innovation, we can think of an initial situation where many firms are willing to supply at the cost of c, which can serve as a competitive fringe. Among them, orily two órms, Ul and U2, are capable of making cost-reducing innovations.
Recall that q(x, y) denotes the equilibrium output for a downstream firm when it pays the input price of x and the rival firm pays y. Since one unit of input is needed to produce one unit of final product, we can use q(x, y) to obtain the derived demand for upstream firms. For instance, suppose that both upstream firms supply the generalized input. In this case, if Ui and Uj sell the input at the price of x and y, respectively, ixj, and x~max(y, c), then, Ui's demand function can be written as 2q(x, x) while Uj's demand is zero. Ui's profit is given by (x-c)2q(x, x) if its production cost is c. In contrast, if Ui supplies a specialized input for Di, then, its demand function when it charges x can be written as q(x, y), when U is the lowest price supplier for Di and Dj pays an input price of y. Ui's profit in this case is (x-c)q(x, y) when its production cost is c. These profit furtctions for upstream firms are assumed to be well-behaved concave functions. Tõ ' In thic respec,t, a decisioo to support only onc hardware Cormat is similar to tying in its exdusiooary effecx in that olher hardware vendors of competing formats arc foreclosed. For an analysia of tying as an exclusionary dcvitt see Whinstoa (1990) and Clwi (1996) . Church and Gandal (1995) also discuss the relatiooship between compalibility and tying decisioas in their [oreclosure effects. " ln other contexts, it may be more appropriate tt~at the probability of low cost reali7ation is higher for a specialized input. Allowing this po~ssibility does not change the qualilative results of the paper and onty malces the main a8'ecu of vertical integration less transparent.
abstract from the tedious process of deriving the monopolistic input supplier's optimal pricing strategy, we make the following assumption. Assumption 2.
Assumption 2 ensures that the competitive pressure of fringe firms is always binding. In other words, the monopolistic supplier of inputs will always have incentive to set a higher price than c in the absence of fringe firtns. This implies that when there is only one firm with the cost of c it wiU set the price of the input at c(minus e) . This condition ís satisfied if the difference between c and c is not too large. [f we interpret the low cost real'nation event as an innovation, Assumption 2 is also referted to as a nondrastic innovation in the RBcD literature.
Assumptáo 3.
rz(c c)ta(c,c)~rz(c,c)}a(c, c)
Assumption 3 states that the aggregate industry profit is higher when the downstream firms have asymmetric cost structures with their mean costs constant This assumption is satisóed in a variety of oligopoly models since competition tends to be more intense, and as a result, more indusiry rent is dissipated when firms are more symmetrically positioned in terms of costs (Tirole, 1988, p. 223) .
To analyze potential anti-competitive effects of vertical foreclosure, we consider the foUowing Sve stage game. The game structure closely follows O-S-S to facilitate comparison.~' In the first stage, the downstream firms bid to acquire one of the upstream
supphers. As in O-S-S, if there is a merger, we assume that it occurs between U 1 and D I
In the second stage, we allow the possibility of a counter-merger between U2 and D2, provided there is a merger between U 1 and D I . In the third stage, each upstream firrn decides on the type of inputs (G or SJ that will be supplied. The choice of input 's Soe also Flart and Tirole (1990) for delailed comments on the timing of the game.
specifications is considered irreversible at later stages Our main emphasis is on how the vertical structure uf the industry atTects the choice of input specifications. In the fourth stage, input costs are realized depending on the choices of input specifications made by the upstream firms. Note that the distribution of cost realizations depends on the choice of input specifications. In particular, we assume that producing the same type of input causes their production costs to be positively correlated. Given cost realizations and the industry structure, input prices for the downstream firms are determined. [n the final stage, downstream prices are chosen, given input prices. To derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, we proceed by backward induction.
B. lrrput Specifcity under Yarious Yertica! Structures
In this subsection, we analyze the equilibrium choice of input specifications under two altemative vertical structures -nonintegration (WI) and partial (vertical) integration , c) . The probability of this event is given by (1-p~4. In other events, the firm earns zero profit due to competition. Therefore, the expected profit for each upstream firm under (G,G) is given by:
, where 4-( c-c, 9( c. c).
For future reference, we also derive the expected profit for downstream firms. Under (G, G), the input prices will be c for all cost real'vations except (c , c), in which case input prices are driven to c due to Bertrand competition. Therefore, the expected profit for each downstream firm is given by realization while Uj has the high cost realization, ixj. The probability of this asymmetric cost reali7ation is reduced as the correlation parameter p increases. In this sense, p can be considered as a parameter representing the intensity of competition. When p is low (p Sll2), choosing G is a dominant strategy for both upstream firms. The reason for this is that choosing a specialized input is too costly a choice because it entails giving up half of the potential market. As p increases further than I l2, however, competition becomes too intense. This creates an incentive for one of the upstream firms to choose a different input specification to relax competition by reducing cost correlation. As a result, (G, G) cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium if p is too high (p~Il2).
Note that relaxing competition by reduced cost correlation requires that only one firm switch to a specialized input. Since choosing a specific input involves the cost of giving up the opportunity to serve the other half of the market, this implies that the choice of specific input is analogous to the provision of a public good; while the benefit of reduced correlation is shared by both upstream firms, the cost of it is solely borne by the firm switching to a specialized input. This implies that from the collective viewpoint of the upstream firms, their costs tend to be too correlated in the market outcome, that is, they choose the same specification of input (the generalized input) too often (Dasgupta IG and Maskin, 1987) ." This also explains why the input specification game has the payoff matrix of a chicken game when p~I12, with two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria and one symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
In the rest of the paper, we focus mainly on the case where p E[o, U2] for two reasons. First, it enables us to avoid the issue of multiple equilibria. Second, and more importantly, the issue of vertical integration-induced foreclosure does not arise when p 112 because vertical foreclosure is already present, even with independent suppliers.
Thus, we explore how vertical integration can change the incentives to supply a specialized input when both upstream firms supply the generalized input and compete with each other under M.
At this stage, it is ertlightening to consider the effect of the U 1's choice of S, on other firms. U2 benefits from U l's choice of specific input through two channels. First, it exercises monopoly power over D2 due to U 1's commitment to supply only to D I.
Second, cost correlation is reduced across the two upstream firms. As pointed out earGer, D2 loses because its input price is raised due to Ul's withdrawal as a potential supplier of its input. Most importantly, D 1 gains because its mal fvm's cost is raised ( Salop and
Scheffman, 1983). The recognition of these externalities will be crucial to understand the incentives to choose a specialized input when one of the upstream firms is vertically integrated; vertical integration provides a mechanism to internalize the positive extemality (the bene6t from raising the rivals' costs) on D I of choosing S,.
2. Partia! Integ~ation (PU L.et us assume that the industry has a partially integrated structure, i.e., U1 and D1 have vertically integrated whereas U2 and D2 remain independent. We assume that vertical integration dces not entail any changes in the underlying production technology."
"It can be easily verified that the joint profits o(upaream firn~s increase whea ore of the finns chooso a spacializod input if y~(1-~).
Within the vertically integrated fitTn (iJl-D1), U1 supplies its output at the internal transfer price equal to its marginal cost of production. ARer integration, the decision on input specification will be made based on its impact on combined profits of U I-D I We can write the profit for the integrated firm under various configurations of input specification in the following way.
Suppose that both integrated firm and nortintegrated upstream firm U2 have chosen to produce the generalized input that can be used by both downstream firms. In 
I~Lei~-o~(G, G) -I 4P rz(c, c) t I 4p [a(c c)}~] t~rz(~.~)
Note that in writing ( 11), we, unlike O-S-S, do not assume the ability of the integrated firm to make cornntitments rwt to supply to D2 or to a specific price As a result, when both upstream firms have the low cost, the input price to D2 will be driven to c due to competition.
" In other worda, we abstract from intental organi7ation aspats of vertical integration that may induce different production oosts of inputs across inlegrated and nonintegrated upstream firms through various irtcentive effats. A recent literature on the internal organizauon of the firm, for instance, emphasizes how vertical iotegration affacts 1he incentive to malce a relauonship-specific investment try elitninating the possibility a~f posl{onuactual opportunistic behavior (Klein, Crawford, and Alctuan, 1978) or through the allocatioa of residual rights of control over asscts (Grossman and Flart, 19g6) .
tx Now suppose that the integrated firm, UI-DI, chooses S, whereas U2 chooses G.
Then, the integrated firm cannot sell to D2 even when it is the only low cost producer.
Due to the lack of competition, the input cost for D2 is always c. Since there is no profit for Ul, the integrated firm's expected profit under ( S,, G) is
n(c, c}t 2 n(c , c)
Proceeding in the same way, we can derive the expected proóts for the integrated firm under altemative input speciócations. 
-[nL,c) -nL,~)] (l~) p' --f t[~r(c,c)-~L,~1
With modified incentives accompanying vertical integration, we can derive the following proposition.
Propositioo 2. Let us restrict our attention to the parameter region where (G, G) is the unique equiGbrium under nonintegration, i.e., p E[o, Il2J. Then, we have the following charactervation of equilibrium choices of input specification under partial integration. [~r(c,c)-~r(. c,c) ]. When UI and D1 remain as independent 6rms, this positive externality is not accounted for when UI decides on its input speciócation. As an integrated fim~, this benefit is taken into consideration in its input specification decision.
The non-emptiness of the set E is crucial for the input specialization-induced market foreclosure to occur with partial integration. The set also needs to be reasonably
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Iarge for the type of rnarket foreclosure considered in this paper to have practical importance. Hence, it is worthwhile to explore the plausibility of such a set. The examination of Eq. (17) reveals that the existence and the size of the set E depends on the relative magnitudes of~and [n(c,c) -rr(c,c) ]. In particular, p' decreases with   [~r(c,c) -a(-c,c)], which impGes that the set E expand as [~r(c,c) -~r(s,c) 
For E to be an empty set, it is required that p'~112, or~~3 [n(c,c) -n(e,c)],
which is a quite stringent condition to satisfy. For instance, from our discussion above, we know that this condition is never satisfied for a Cournot competition with linear demand or for a Hotelling-type price competition. Therefore, we conctude that for almost '~Note that~rt~res the increase in lhe rival downstream firm' s inpul acqwsition cust due to venical foreclosure.
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all conceivable oligopoly models of downstream competition, there exists a set (E) that induces market foreclosure with partial integration.
C. lncentives for Anti~ompetitive Vertica! lntegration
In this subsection, we analyze the incentive to vertically integrate. If vertical integration dces not involve the changes in the types of inputs produced by the merged firms, there is no vertical foreclosure on D2, and its only effect is the elimination of double marginalization for the UI-D1 pair. In most standard oligopoly models, this effect tends to increase total output and reduce prices for consumers. As a result, social welfare increases. To focus on potential anti-competitive effects of vertical integration, we concentrate on the case where the equilibrium input specification is changed from (G, G) to (S,,G) after vertical integration, that is, p E E-[Q, I l2].
Then, the condition that vertical integration is profitable is given by:
By rearranging terms, the condition for proótable partial integration ( PI) can be rewritten
The effect of vertical integration on the combined profits of U I and D 1 comprises of three elements. The first term on the RHS of (19) is the positive effect of raising the rival firm's costs when both firms have a low cost realization. The second term is the effect of eliminating double marginali7ation between U 1 and D 1 when U 1 has a lower cost reali7ation and U2 has a higher cost realization. Before vertical integration, DI is supplied at the price of c by Ul. ARer vertical integration, Ul transfers input internally to Dl at the marginal cost c. In contrast to the successive monopoly case analyzed by Spengler (1950) , this effect, in general, is ambiguous in the oligopoly. [t depends on the cost differential between c and c and on whether the strategic variables are strategic complements or substitutes. The third term is the negative effect of giving up part of the market by producing a specialized input with vertical integration. Therefore, we can conclude that if the bene6cial effect of raising the rival firm's costs is sufficiendy important relative to the loss of upstream business, there can be an anti-competitive vertical merger.
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If the nature of downstream competition is strategic substitutes, then the incentive for vertical merger will be reinforced by the elimination of double marginali7ation. If the strategic variable is strategic complements, the effect of the second term will weaken the incentive to vertically merge if the difference between c and c is small, while it will strengthen it if the difference is large [see Bonanno and Vickers, 1988] .
As emphasized by the Chicago school and O-S-S, to have a complete theory of anti-competitive mergers, we also need to analyze the incentíve to countermerge by the remaining independent firms, which can undo the initial anti-competitive effect of the merger by U 1 and D 1.
D. Incentive for Counter-merger
In this section, we analyze the incentive for D2 to countermerge with U2 in the face of the vertical merger between U 1 and D 1. There will be a counter-merger if U2 and D2, as an integrated órm, can make more profits than the combined profits they can earn as separate identities. We know that after U1-D1 merger, the merged firm chooses S, whereas U2 chooses G, if p E E-[R, 1~2]. Therefore, without a counter-merger, U2 and D2's expected profits as separate entities can be written as: Under full integration (FI), therefore, (G, G) is once again the Nash equilibrium in input specifications if the following condition is satisfied:
1-p -á{[rz(c, c~i-it( c, c)] -[n(~,~)} rz(~,~)] } t 4~~o
Let us define p" be the unique critical value which makes IiFl~p~(G, G) -ll;,',.p, (S,, G),
i.e.,(
t[n(c, c) -~r(c, c)] -[ n(c. c)-~(c, f)l
By conducting an analysis similar to the cases of nonintegration and partial integration, we can state the following.
Propositiou 3. Under fuU integration, the equilibrium in the choices of input specification can be characterized in the following way:
is the unique Nash equilibrium,
(ii) if p~p", there exist multiple equilibria. There are two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria, which are (S,,G) and (G, S,). In addition, there is a symmetric mixed strategy equilibria in which Ui chooses S, with probability of
Therefore, we can define a set [p, p] as long as the set E we defined earlier is non-empty, where p -min(p", 1~2). When p E [R, p] , the choice of input specification is such that with partia! integration the integrated firm chooses a specialiaed input and vertical foreclosure occurs, while in all other cases of vertical structures both upstream firrns choose the generalized input. Now suppose that p e [Q, p] . Then, the relevant combined profit after countermerger is iI,Fl,.i.~(G, G). The condition for the countennerger to not be proótable is given by:
By rearranging Eq. (22), we can write the no counter-merger condition (NCM) as follows: aCc, , -n( c ,~) 
] t [rz(~,~) -a(~,~)] }
-á{ [a(c, c)}rz(~,~]-[rz(c,c) 
ta(c, c)]}-[á(2~)t á 4]~0.
E. Hold-ou1 Problem?
In this section, we analyze the bidding process through which an upstream firm is For a variety of oligopoly models, the increase in cost asymmetry due to a vertical merger reduces competition and is harmful for social welfare even if it is privately optimal for the firrns (Tirole, 1988) . In the next section, we consider expGcit models of oligopoly which allow us to completely characterize the conditions for an equilibrium vertical merger and its welfare consequences.
. Aoalysia of Ezplicit E:amples
We demonstrate the plausibility of the anti-competitive effects of vertical 27 integation with examples of a Hotelling-type spatial competition and Cournot competition in the final product market.
I Hotelling Competition in the Final Produd Market
Suppose that two downstream firms are located at the end points of the unit interval. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the interval. They demand only one unit of the good and have reservation values of v, which is assumed to be sufficiently large to ertsure that the market is covered. We identify a consumer with the point in the interval which represents her ideal variety of a product. A consumer buying a product located at the distance of x away from her ideal variety will incur utility loss of tx, in addition to the price of the good, where t is a"transport" cost parameter. Then, we can derive the demand function for each downstream firm as (see Tirole, 1988 , Chapter 7 for details): (23) q' (P~, Pr) -2} P~2lP~' i-1,2 and ixj.
Each downstream firm chooses p;to maximize its own profit given the other firrn's price p, and its input price m;. The resulting equilibrium quantities are given by Under nonintegration, we know that both downstream firms have the same marginal cost regardless of the realizations of the upstream costs, and as a result, market share for each firm is always 112. Therefore, the total transportation cost is given by uz, ,,,,,v, -2 Jo txllac -4 Also, we know that inputs will be produced at the high cost of c only when both upstream órms have cost realizations of c. In all other cases, inputs will be supplied by the low cost firm and the production cost of inputs will be c. Therefore, the expected production cost under nonintegration is 
4[G~-G~") -( I t P)~~(~.~) t n(~,~') -2n~,~)~} P~2 4}~Ĩ
n the Cournot oligopoly (see the Appendix), L where a-a-c and~-c-c .
Therefore, the gains from the initial merger (G"') is Iarger than gains from the countermerger (G`") if p~[2a -3~v7a. If this inequality holds, we can find F such that G"'~F~G`~; the initial merger is proótable but the countermerger is not.
The condition above is more likely to be satisfied as the cost correlation parameter Therefore, we can always find a range of F which prevents countermerging without causing the hold-out problem ( ilu~-D~-Rí~n-DS~F~G`"~. RBcD incentives and how this effed influences the vertical integration decision.19 "Choi and Yi (1996) analyze vertical integratioo az a way to relax RdcD competition. Sae also Baldwin (1983) .
e e' -2-6r Therefore, we have 
